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Abstract
Reproductive freedom plays a pivotal role in debates on the ethics of procreation. This moral principle protects people’s 
interests in procreative matters and allows them discretion over whether to have children, the number of children they have 
and, to a certain extent, the type of children they have. Reproductive freedom’s theoretical and political emphasis on people’s 
autonomy and well-being is grounded in an individual-centred framework for discussing the ethics of procreation. It pro-
tects procreators’ interests and significantly reduces the permissible grounds for interference by third parties. In this article 
I show that procreative decisions have far-reaching effects on the composition and size of the population. The upshot of 
considering these effects allows for the appreciation of the inadequacy of a framework that solely considers individual (i.e. 
procreators’) interests to discuss the ethics of procreation. To address such inadequacy, I assess costs and benefits of past 
and present proposals to reflect on procreation in such a way as to consider its far-reaching effects. I conclude by arguing 
that reproductive freedom should be defended as an imperfect but instrumentally necessary tool. This framing would enable 
those participating in debates on the ethics of procreative decisions to work towards an ethical framework that accounts for 
the cumulative effects of these decisions.
Keywords Procreation · Reproductive freedom · Eugenics · Climate change
Introduction
Reproductive freedom plays a pivotal role in debates on the 
ethics of procreation. This moral principle protects people’s 
interests in procreative matters and allows them discretion 
over whether or not to have children, the number of chil-
dren they have and, to a certain extent, the type of children 
they have (Buchanan et al. 2001; Brock 2005; Harris 1998; 
Robertson 1994). It is invoked within debates on reproduc-
tive technologies, abortion and contraception to defend these 
practices against restrictions, statutory bans and other kinds 
of interferences from third parties. Reproductive freedom is 
at the core of these defences as exercising freedom in pro-
creative matters is thought to be relevant for people’s auton-
omy and well-being (Brock 2005). According to defenders 
of such freedom, having and raising children are core human 
activities that, for many, intersect with dearly held values 
and notions of a good life (Brock 2005). These activities 
are also “central to personal identity, to dignity, and to the 
meaning of one’s life” (Robertson 1994, p. 24).
The recognition of the relevance of exercising freedom 
in procreative matters for people’s personal autonomy and 
well-being counts among the theoretical successes of repro-
ductive freedom. In addition, reproductive freedom plays, 
and has played, an important performative role in contem-
porary and past political struggles to secure access to con-
traception, termination of pregnancies, and to allow new 
assisted reproductive technologies (Cavaliere and Harris 
2018). On practical grounds, then, reproductive freedom 
has a positive track record in terms of protecting people’s 
interests.
Despite this, defences of reproductive freedom have not 
gone unchallenged. Conceptual and normative critiques of 
this principle are manifold.1 Some of these critiques are  * Giulia Cavaliere 
 giulia.cavaliere@kcl.ac.uk
1 Department of Global Health & Social Medicine, School 
of Global Affairs, King’s College London, Room 3.12, Bush 
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1 I return to some of these critiques in “A broader framework: present 
proposals” section, where I limit my analysis to those motivated by a 
concern for the well-being and interests of others (i.e. others than the 
procreators and their close networks).
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motivated by a broader dissatisfaction with the dominant 
individualistic understanding of the principle of autonomy 
within healthcare settings (Dove et al. 2017). Others are 
motivated by the limited reach of reproductive freedom and 
its centring around non-interference clauses (Mills 2013). 
According to this critique, reproductive freedom is narrowly 
focused on removing statutory bans and other barriers to 
exercise reproductive rights, while leaving unchallenged 
structural injustices and other legal, economic, social and 
political barriers to access services (Roberts 1997). Another 
set of critiques have targeted the language of ‘choice’ and 
how it masks the constraints women experience in real-life 
situations (Lippman 1999; Löwy 2015; Roberts 1997; Roth-
man 1985; Samerski 2009). According to these critiques, 
the focus on choice favours commercial, rather than wom-
en’s, interests and it renders hegemonic norms and ways of 
conduct, thereby constraining women’s freedom  (Rothman 
1985; Samerski 2009). While these critiques raise impor-
tant objections, in this article I argue that one of the most 
problematic features of reproductive freedom concerns the 
individual-centred framework that this principle rests upon. 
Reproductive freedom’s theoretical and political emphasis 
on people’s autonomy, dignity and well-being is conceptu-
ally and normatively problematic, as it fails to account for 
other relevant interests than those of the procreators and for 
the effects of procreative decisions on these interests.
In what follows, I first illustrate how reproductive freedom is 
grounded in an individual-centred framework. Then, I provide 
examples to show that procreative decisions have far-reaching 
effects that cannot be adequately captured and normatively 
appraised within such individual-centred framework. To coun-
ter the tendency to frame procreative decisions as a private 
matter, I move to an analysis and evaluation of past and con-
temporary proposals that adopt a broader framework to reflect 
on the far-reaching effects of procreative decisions. I conclude 
by presenting some of the challenges that need to be addressed 
prior to adopt a broader framework, one that enables to assess 
normatively desirable and undesirable courses of actions.
Reproductive freedom 
and the individual‑centred framework
Reproductive freedom protects people’s interests and it 
significantly reduces the ethically and legally permissible 
grounds for interference by third parties. Within discourses 
on reproductive freedom, procreation is often conceived as 
a private matter and is defended from third parties’ interfer-
ences for this reason. This feature of reproductive freedom 
reflects contemporary Western democracies’ emphasis on 
protecting people’s freedom of agency from third parties’ 
interference. Such freedom has its root in John Stuart Mill’s 
(1979/1859) so called ‘harm principle’, which states that:
[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, 
against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own 
good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient war-
rant. (1979/1859)
This Millian presumption in favour of freedom considers the 
risk of harm occurrence or the occurrence of harm to others 
the only justifiable grounds for interference and it places 
the burden of proof on attempts to limit such freedom. As 
with other freedoms protected in liberal democratic socie-
ties, the freedom to decide in matters of procreation is not 
absolute and other considerations can rightfully constrain 
its scope (Brock 2005; Dworkin 1993). Such considerations 
often have a bearing on limits to reproductive freedom put in 
place to protect the well-being and the interests of the child 
who is born as a result of the procreative act. For instance, 
reproductive freedom protects women from interference in 
the choice of whether to become pregnant and to continue a 
pregnancy, but it would not protect them from interference 
against consuming harmful substances during pregnancy. 
Consuming substances may harm the (future) child and 
hence constitute a legitimate reason for third-party interfer-
ence. Other than considerations pertaining to the welfare of 
the (future) child, interference in reproductive decisions may 
be justified by concerns for (social) justice (Ross 2006); soli-
darity (see for instance discussions on genome editing and 
human reproduction: Nuffield Council 2018); and resource 
allocation (Rulli 2016a), among others.2 Within discourses 
on reproductive freedom, these and other concerns moti-
vated by protecting the well-being and interests of others 
are arguably more controversial than those focusing on the 
welfare of the (future) child. Curtailing or limiting reproduc-
tive freedom is often resisted due to the negative impact on 
people’s well-being and autonomy. As a result, third parties’ 
interests–as opposed to direct or indirect harms to these third 
parties–tend to be regarded as less morally significant than 
the interests of the procreators (Harris 1998; Mills 2013; 
Robertson 1994).
The problem with reproductive freedom: 
procreation and effects on third parties
Despite reproductive freedom’s emphasis on protecting indi-
viduals’ (i.e. procreators’) interests, procreative decisions have 
effects on third parties whose interference reproductive free-
dom protects against. For instance, these decisions inevitably 
affect the size and the structure3 of the population, which in 
2 I am indebted to an anonymous reviewer for bringing these issues 
to my attention.
3 In this paper, I follow Hickey et  al.’s (2016) distinction between 
size and structure and adopt these two categories in my analysis of 
the effects on third parties of procreative decisions. While what 
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turn have effects on third parties’ lives and interests. That pro-
creative decisions affect the size of the population seems rela-
tively uncontroversial: some people have siblings, and some 
do not, due to the procreative behaviours of their parents. 
This, at the micro-level, affects the lives of these people and 
the lives of their kin group. Moving to the macro-level, the 
decline in fertility rates of people living in developed coun-
tries and, to a lesser extent, in developing countries, affects the 
number of people who will inhabit our planet in the future. A 
trend that depends on the cumulative effects of the procreative 
decisions of people currently living in these countries. This 
decline in fertility changes the size of the (future) popula-
tion and affects people’s lives by, for instance, affecting the 
economic growth of a given country, its pension schemes, the 
organisation of its labour market and so forth.4
Procreation can also affect the structure of the population. 
The Zika virus epidemic that began in early 2015 in Latin 
America provides an example of this. Procreating during 
the epidemic meant that children had a higher risk of being 
born with physical abnormalities and developmental dis-
orders than, say, before or after the epidemic. Something 
similar can be said about hereditable genetic conditions. For 
known carriers of harmful genetic mutations, procreating 
‘naturally’, i.e. without turning to IVF coupled with pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), means that children 
born as a result of the procreative act have a higher than 
normal chance of inheriting harmful genetic mutations. In 
turn, relying on PGD or seeking gamete donors decreases 
the risk of having a child with mutations that could lead to 
genetic diseases. Both procreative behaviours (i.e. procre-
ating or refraining from procreating during the Zika virus 
epidemic and procreating ‘naturally’ or with technological 
aid) are protected by reproductive freedom, but they play a 
role in shaping the structure of the population. This, in turn, 
can affect the lives of other people. Allen Buchanan (1996, 
2011) provides an example that clarifies how the structure of 
the population, namely the kind of people that are brought 
into existence, has far-reaching effects on both these people 
and on third parties. The author defines ‘dominant coop-
erative framework’ the “dominant institutional infrastruc-
ture for productive interaction” (Buchanan 1996, p. 40). He 
argues that choosing which dominant cooperative framework 
to employ will likely end up favouring the legitimate inter-
ests of one group over those of another (Buchanan 2011). 
Such decision indeed entails determining who will be able to 
participate in the cooperative interaction and who will not.5 
To illustrate this point, Buchanan devises the ‘card game 
analogy’. In this analogy, a group of people gathers to play 
a card game. While half of these people are able and want to 
play a complex game such as Bridge, the other half wants to 
and is only able to play a simple game called Go Fish. If the 
group decides to play Bridge, then the game will be spoiled 
as half of the participants would not be able to play effec-
tively. If, instead, the group settles on playing Go Fish, then 
all the participants will be able to play the game effectively, 
but those who wanted to play Bridge would have to disregard 
their interest in playing a more complex game. According to 
Buchanan, these scenarios illustrate a potential conflict of 
legitimate interests between a group’s interest in inclusion 
and another group’s interest in the effective functioning of 
the cooperative framework. This is relevant for the present 
discussion. The structure of the population plays a role in 
determining the kind of cooperative framework that needs 
to be employed to, on the one hand, favour inclusion, and on 
the other, favour effective functioning. In turn, the choice of 
the framework affects both the lives of the procreators and 
of others.
Naturally and humanly constituted environments of a cer-
tain geographical region influence how children born as a 
result of procreative decisions contribute in different ways 
to the society they live in. For instance, children born in a 
region affected by extreme climatic conditions or by vio-
lent conflict (say Syria since 2010), as opposed to born in a 
region with favourable climatic conditions and functioning 
institutions (say the Silicon Valley in the same period of 
time) will be able to participate in different ways in the life 
of the society where they are born and raised, affecting in 
turn the lives of others born and raised in that society. In 
Lorenzo Del Savio et al. (2018), we refer to ‘cooperative 
infrastructures’ as “any material or immaterial technology 
that contributes to people’s ability to produce human goods 
through their interaction with others” (Del Savio et al. 2018). 
The humanly and naturally constituted environments where 
one is born determine to a large extent the type and qual-
ity of the cooperative infrastructures that one has access to, 
which in turn determine again, to a large extent, the type 
and quality of the contribution to human goods that one is 
capable of making (Del Savio et al. 2018).
4 It must be noted that here I remain neutral as to whether these 
changes are desirable or not as this depends on a number of varia-
bles (such as for instance how these changes are designed and imple-
mented and to serve what interests). What matters for the present dis-
cussion is that population’s size affects the lives of other people than 
the individual procreators and their close network.
5 In Buchanan’s (1996) words: “choosing the dominant coopera-
tive scheme means choosing who will and who will not be disabled” 
(Buchanan 1996, p. 40).
Hickey et al. (2016) mean by population ‘size’ strikes me as intuitive, 
when I discuss population ‘structure’ I am referring to the composi-
tion of the population: namely to the type of people who collectively 
shape the structure of the population.
Footnote 3 (continued)
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These are just a few examples of how the effects of pro-
creative decisions, albeit protected by reproductive freedom, 
have far-reaching effects on third parties and on their legiti-
mate interests. They are also examples of how an individual-
centred framework to discuss the ethics of procreation fails 
to account for such effects. It may seem puzzling that having 
one or more children or that having a child during the Zika 
virus epidemic has tangible effects on the overall population. 
It is true that such decisions, taken separately, do not have 
significant effects. Despite this, as Dan Brock (2005) argues:
The effect of many individual decisions, themselves 
each rational and justified as individual choices, may 
be collectively undesirable [or desirable] for a group or 
society. ([emphasis added] Brock 2005, p. 378)
Reproductive freedom and the individual-centred framework 
that this principle rests upon are limited in scope. They fail 
to include these far-reaching effects on third parties in nor-
mative debates on procreation and do not allow for trade-offs 
in the event of conflicts of legitimate interests. Hence, the 
question that the rest of this article focuses on is whether 
there are alternative frameworks to discuss the ethics of 
procreation that are better suited to ground such normative 
debates. To address this question, I present and evaluate past 
and present proposals to reflect on the ethics of procrea-
tion in ways that consider such far-reaching and cumulative 
effects. Concerning the past, I argue that twentieth century 
eugenics provides an example of conceptualising procrea-
tion broadly and an important lesson as to what could go 
wrong with this approach.6 Concerning present proposals to 
conceive procreation more broadly, I show that an increasing 
number of authors have begun to advocate for some kind of 
‘population engineering’, namely what Colin Hickey and 
co-authors define as “the intentional manipulation of the size 
and structure of human populations” (Hickey et al. 2016, 
p. 845).
A broader framework: lessons from the past
Central to twentieth century eugenic ideas and movements 
was a concern for the effects of procreation on the socio-
political and economic scaffolding of society. Eugenic-
inspired population engineering programmes were con-
stituted by a heterogeneous range of practices, policies, 
ideologies, movements and thinkers (Adams 1990; Bashford 
and Levine 2010; Connelly 2008; Meloni 2016; Paul 1984). 
Eugenic practices included negative interventions such as 
forced sterilisations of people of colour and of the so-called 
‘feeble-minded’ in the U.S. (Kevles 1985; Roberts 1997) and 
Scandinavian countries (Broberg and Roll-Hansen 2005); 
mass killings of disabled people such as those commit-
ted during the Nazi Aktion T4 programme (Adams 1990; 
Buchanan et al. 2001); immigration policies aimed at selec-
tively accepting immigrants depending on their geographic 
and racial origins (Kevles 1985); feminist advocacy for free 
distribution of birth control domestically (Roberts 1997) 
and internationally (Connelly 2008; Murphy 2017); and 
socialist-parties’ attempts to re-organise the welfare state by 
limiting certain groups’ procreative decisions (Koch 2004; 
Paul 1984). Part of the history of eugenics were also posi-
tive interventions aimed at favouring the birth of strong and 
healthy individuals, such as the American fitter family con-
tests (Lombardo 2008), ante-natal clinics, school inspection 
services and free school meals (Porter 2005). In addition to 
this variation between negative and positive interventions, a 
diverse range of theories of heredity, with elements of both 
Lamarkism and Mendelism (Gyngell and Selgelid 2016), 
as well as of both ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ theories were called 
into justify eugenic principles and policies (Meloni 2016). 
Despite this heterogeneity in terms of measures, policies 
and practices, the idea of changing the size and structure of 
the population in ways that would increase economic pro-
duction (Murphy 2017), relieve poverty (Roberts 1997) and 
favour the breading of a better human stock (Buchanan et al. 
2001) was a shared feature of these differing endeavours. 
During the long history of eugenics, procreation was thought 
to be a matter of concern for the state rather than something 
concerning citizens’ private sphere and it was organised to 
produce aggregate benefits. Various governments around the 
globe considered legitimate the exercise of control over the 
bodies of women, immigrants, ethnic minorities, disabled 
and poor people in order to favour what was believed to be 
the overall improvement of the gene pool (Connelly 2008).
What went wrong
What the most despicable features of eugenic ideologies and 
the programmes enacted in their name were is matter of con-
troversy within normative debates on assisted reproduction 
(Bashford 2010; Cavaliere 2018). While some features of 
eugenics such as forced sterilisations are universally con-
demned, there is no agreement among authors concerning 
other features. One of the main points of controversy rests 
on the rightness or wrongness of the aims of eugenics vis-
à-vis the means employed to pursue these aims. Eugenics’ 
quest for genetic improvement is considered by some (see 
for instance: Agar 2008; Wilkinson 2010) an acceptable 
aim that was enacted in wrongful and coercive ways. For 
6 In discussing the history of eugenics, I follow the tradition of 
authors who engage with such history and with eugenics’ under-
pinning ideologies, practices and policies while resisting outright 
condemnations (see for instance: Agar 2008; Buchanan et  al. 2001; 
Glover 2006; Selgelid 2014; Wilkinson 2010).
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others, eugenics’ drive towards perfection is intrinsically, i.e. 
regardless of the means employed, a misguided and wrong-
ful enterprise7 (see for instance: Sandel 2007).
In their ‘autopsy of eugenics’, Buchanan et al. (2001) 
consider five theses to address the question of why eugenics 
was wrong.8 They discard the hypothesis that the wrong-
ness of eugenic programmes rests on their collective rather 
than individual-centred focus and maintain that “the social 
goal is not automatically suspect” (Buchanan et al. 2001, 
p. 55). Rather, they contend that the problem with eugenic 
programmes is a matter of justice in that they failed to fairly 
distribute the burdens and benefits of the control exercised 
over procreation:
The eugenics movements of 1870-1950 insisted – 
wrongly, as it turned out – that humankind faced a 
grave threat (degeneration) and stood to gain a large 
benefit (more able, fit people) if humans would submit 
to the kind of breeding programs that had been used 
to improve plants and livestock. But who would ben-
efit and at whose expenses? […] The ‘underclass’ is 
simultaneously the group of people whose genes were 
not wanted and the people who, through involuntary 
sexual segregation, stigmatization and denigration, 
sterilization, and even murder, paid the price. ([empha-
sis added] Buchanan et al. 2001, p. 52)
Population engineering programmes of the past were 
designed in such ways that the burdens would systematically 
fall on certain groups, such as ethnic minorities, disabled 
people, poor people and immigrants, while the benefits of 
these programmes would be enjoyed mostly by the ‘fit’, the 
rich and educated, many of whom were white. Epistemic and 
political problems were at the heart of this unjust distribu-
tion of burdens and benefits, which should be considered 
within any contemporary attempt to discuss the normative 
effects of procreative decisions whilst taking into account 
the interests of people other than the procreators.
These epistemic and political problems can be traced 
back to how beliefs on the differential economic worth of 
people for society translated into beliefs of the differential 
moral worth of said people (Murphy 2017). Past popula-
tion engineering programmes, aimed at enhancing the GDP 
(Murphy 2017) or at relieving poverty among black minori-
ties in developed countries (Roberts 1997), disproportionally 
targeted and affected people from the lower classes of devel-
oped countries and people living in developing countries. 
Such beliefs found justification in a view of heredity that 
Maurizio Meloni (2016) defines as ‘radical biologism’. 
Manifestations of pauperism, disability and precariousness 
were linked to biological characteristics and hence consid-
ered heritable. These epistemically flawed beliefs served as 
a source of inspiration for eugenic policies and, at the same 
time, resonated with extant racist, sexist and ableist politi-
cal beliefs (Meloni 2016). That epistemically and politically 
troubling beliefs can give rise to ethically troubling strate-
gies for intervening in procreation is one of the most impor-
tant lessons to be learned from past population engineering 
programmes.
A broader framework: present proposals
Proposals to reflect on procreation in ways that take into 
account the interests of people other than the procreators 
are also discussed by contemporary advocates of population 
engineering. These authors make two types of claims: Mal-
thusian-inspired claims regarding the size of the population 
(Cafaro 2012; Das Gupta 2014; Hickey et al. 2016; Rieder 
2016; Young 2001) and eugenics-inspired claims regarding 
the structure of the population (Anomaly 2014, 2018; Brock 
2005). The first group focuses on the toll of bringing new 
persons into the world on resources and the environment. 
They maintain that there are good moral reasons to favour 
adoption instead of relying on costly assisted reproductive 
technologies (Overall 2012; Rulli 2016b), to refrain from 
having more than one child (Rieder 2016), to pursue alter-
native ways to ‘make kin’ instead of procreating (Haraway 
2015) and to forgo or limit procreative aspirations altogether 
(Cafaro 2012; Conly 2015; Das Gupta 2014; Rieder 2016; 
Young 2001). The second group focuses instead on popula-
tion structure and on the costs of unconstrained procrea-
tion for current and future generations. Their view is that 
the problem with an unconstrained procreative behaviour 
is not ‘too many people’, but too many of a certain kind of 
people (Anomaly 2014, 2018; Brock 2005). What unites the 
claims of authors concerned with the size of the population 
and authors concerned with its structure, is that they ques-
tion whether an individual-centred framework is appropri-
ate to address normative challenges raised by procreation. 
To counter the shortcomings of this framework, they frame 
their proposals in ways that consider the cumulative effects 
of individual procreative decisions on third parties. These 
authors also broadly agree that the interests of existing and 
future people may constitute a pro tanto reason in favour 
of interfering with prospective parents’ reproductive free-
dom (Anomaly 2014, 2018; Brock 2005; Rieder 2016; Rulli 
2016b).
For instance, according to Jonathan Anomaly (2014, 
2018), bearing and raising children has “far-reaching effects 
7 For a comprehensive review and assessment of these claims, see 
Giulia Cavaliere (2018).
8 The theses are: ‘replacement, not therapy’; ‘value pluralism’; vio-
lations of reproductive freedom’; ‘statism’ and ‘justice’ (Buchanan 
et al. 2001; see also: Wikler 1999).
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on the genetic composition, cultural trajectory, and general 
welfare of future people” (Anomaly 2014, p. 172). Due to 
these far-reaching effects, procreation needs to be organised 
in ways which are beneficial to both future people them-
selves and those around them. One way of doing so would be 
to influence the structure of the population by favouring the 
transmission of traits such as creativity, humour, productiv-
ity, intelligence and compassion, which are beneficial both 
to those who have these traits and for others. Adopting an 
impartial moral standpoint leads to the conclusion that it is 
better to bring into the world people who will have good 
lives and whose lives can contribute to the well-being of 
others (Anomaly 2014). This means that, all things being 
equal, the birth of children who have traits which are both 
beneficial to them and to the community of people around 
them should be favoured. Anomaly grants that more people 
may translate into more producers, more welfare and a larger 
work force to support an ageing population, but stresses that 
people are not equally productive and that “some represent 
a net cost to their society, or to the world” (Anomaly 2014, 
p. 176).
While Anomaly is concerned with the structure of the 
population, other authors are concerned with its size. These 
authors focus on the different strategies which could be 
devised to mitigate the negative effects of climate change 
and to reduce anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions. 
Travis Rieder (2016) and others (Das Gupta 2014; Hickey 
et al. 2016; Murtaugh and Schlax 2009) contend that the 
most effective way to reduce such emissions is to decrease 
the size of the population by changing people’s procrea-
tive behaviours, as procreation plays an important role with 
respect of the quantity of these emissions (Harte 2007; Mur-
taugh and Schlax 2009; Nolt 2011). The effects of climate 
change on people’s well-being call, in their view, for pro 
tanto moral reasons to refrain from procreation or, at least, 
for reducing the number of children being born. For instance, 
Rieder (2016) argues that people have “procreation-limiting 
duties” (Rieder 2016, p. 9) as:
There are too many people on earth, together emit-
ting too much GHG much too quickly. […] The public 
health crisis of overpopulation leads to the intuitive 
conclusion that morality might demand of each of us 
that we do not contribute to such a crisis. (Rieder 2016, 
p. 10)
Authors in favour of carrying out population engineering 
advocate for measures that seek to address normative chal-
lenges raised by the far-reaching effects of individual procrea-
tive decisions. At the same time, they are cautious as to the 
potential negative externalities of curtailing people’s freedom. 
They adopt different strategies to address the tension between 
the interests (and the freedom) of individual procreators and 
the interests of other people. Rieder (2016), for instance, 
argues that there is more to morality than what is within 
one’s rights. He contends that acting morally entails reducing 
one’s own family size even if this is at odds with one’s own 
rights. Anomaly (2014) instead focuses on reasons to exercise 
caution in “moving from social norms that nudge people to 
make socially beneficial reproductive choices, to using state 
institutions that shape reproductive choices” (Anomaly 2014, 
p. 182). These reasons for caution are: the lack of adequate 
genetic knowledge; the value of reproductive freedom; and 
that agents carrying out population engineering may “pos-
sess imperfect information” and “face perverse incentives” 
(Anomaly 2014, p. 182).
The knowledge of how genes influence behavioural 
traits such as empathy and intelligence (or even aesthetic 
traits such as eye colour or height) and the capacity to edit 
genes to favour the expression of these traits are in their 
infancy to say the least. Despite this, I would argue that 
the current lack of knowledge may not represent per se an 
insurmountable challenge to carrying out population engi-
neering programmes. It may also not represent, as it were, 
an insurmountable (ethical) argument against these pro-
grammes. Studies on the hereditability of IQ date back to 
the beginning of the twentieth century and some progress 
has been made (for a review, see for instance: Ritchie 2015). 
Moreover, if it becomes clear that population engineering 
and Anomaly’s aims of improving the structure of the popu-
lation can be achieved not through prenatal/pre-conception 
genetic interventions, but thanks to controlled epigenetic 
influence, education, welfare provisions and other post-natal 
measures, then the question of the desirability of popula-
tion engineering programmes will remain. In other words, 
the first reason for caution identified by Anomaly (2014) is 
a contingent matter. Similarly, with respect to the second 
reason for caution, it is important to consider that even lib-
eral defences of reproductive freedom allow some degree 
of interference from third parties. What matters is hence 
establishing whether the harms engendered by what repro-
ductive freedom protects warrant some kind of restriction on 
people’s procreative decisions. This needs to be discussed 
while bearing in mind a third reason for caution identified 
by Anomaly (2014), namely the risk that third parties may 
“possess imperfect information” and “face perverse incen-
tives” (Anomaly 2014, p. 182). It is to this third reason that 
I now turn.
What could go wrong
As I have argued above, an important lesson of past propos-
als to rethink procreation is that epistemically and politically 
troubling beliefs can give rise to ethically troubling strate-
gies for intervening in procreation. The problem of these 
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past proposals is not the adoption of a broader framework to 
reflect on and organise procreation. Rather, their troubling 
component rests on how trade-offs between competing inter-
ests were made and burdens and benefits were distributed. In 
this section, I argue that this lesson is also relevant for con-
temporary defences of population engineering programmes.
I identify two main shortcomings of present population 
engineering programmes and proposals: acquiring reliable 
data on who should come into existence and assessing this 
data. Regarding proposals aimed at tackling the structure of 
the population, the first shortcoming concerns the feasibil-
ity of acquiring data on the type of people who could be 
reliably said to contribute to overall increases in the well-
being of future people. Anomaly (2014) argues that the best 
suited to become parents are those with “favorable genetic 
endowment” and “the means to provide a rich social envi-
ronment for their children” (Anomaly 2014, p. 174), as both 
characteristics seem to predict the birth of people whose 
lives have value both for themselves and for others. How-
ever, what counts as favourable genetic endowment and as 
a rich social environment is a complex notion: whether a 
given genetic endowment really turns out to be favourable 
often depends also on people’s social environments. In this 
sense, the assessment of what counts as favourable genetic 
endowment cannot be separated from the assessment of what 
counts as a rich social environment. Not only are these con-
ditions often context-dependent, they are also normatively 
loaded as what counts as ‘favourable’ and ‘rich’ presupposes 
the adoption of a certain normative framework as a refer-
ence. In other words, in an assessment of whether something 
is rich or favourable, an impartial moral standpoint will not 
do. Different groups of people are likely to come up with dif-
ferent assessments of what counts as valuable and competing 
interests are likely to play a role in these assessments.
This brings me to the second shortcoming. If I am right 
about the first, there will be competing assessments of 
what counts as valuable, and therefore different answers 
to the question of what type of people should be allowed 
to come into existence. Hence, a reliable mechanism to 
acquire empirical data that can assist in the selection of 
the best answers to ground future policies becomes neces-
sary. Acquiring this data seems again normatively loaded 
and complex: this data could reflect our current ‘status quo 
biases’ (Bostrom and Ord 2006), racist and discriminatory 
attitudes (Roberts 1997, 2015) and short-sighted or partial 
conceptions of valuable lives (Garland-Thomson 2012; 
Mackenzie and Scully 2007). There are existing studies that 
document IQ hereditability and a correlation between high 
IQ and low fertility (Meisenberg 2009). Despite this, delv-
ing into the history of research on the mechanisms of human 
heredity allows to appreciate that a complicated interplay 
between epistemic and political forces exists: between the 
quest for knowledge and interventions acting upon that 
knowledge (Meloni 2016; Roberts 2015). The type of ques-
tions asked, the hypotheses formulated, the data collected, 
and the inferences drawn are all likely to be influenced by 
existing political views and beliefs (Kitcher 2001). In addi-
tion, it is unclear who should decide what data is to be taken 
into consideration for institutional design and whose norma-
tive framework should be used as a reference. The problem, 
then, is not (or not only) about ‘imperfect information’ and 
‘perverse incentives’ possessed by the state, but rather about 
the difficulty of having reliable mechanisms to assess this 
information both in the context of state interventions and of 
shaping social norms.
Regarding the size of the population, it may seem that the 
proposals outlined above might be less problematic and that 
the challenges discussed might not apply. Economic growth, 
increased levels of welfare, empowering women, better edu-
cational provision and institutions are all viable strategies to 
reduce fertility rates. Despite this, the one-size-fits-all model 
to reduce the size of the population seems to be ill-conceived 
if the aim is to reduce, for example, climate change hazards 
(as noted for instance by Haraway 2015; Rieder 2016). Not 
all people contribute equally to the worsening of climate 
change and not all people are in an equal position to produce 
new resources to minimise these negative effects. Hence, it 
seems reasonable to assume that it would be self-defeating to 
implement measures which seek to reduce everyone’s birth 
rates. Population engineering programmes aimed at reduc-
ing the size of the population cannot be easily disentangled 
from population engineering programmes aimed at influenc-
ing the structure of the population. The two (i.e. size and 
structure) cannot be completely separated today, and they 
were not completely separated in the past9 (Bashford 2014; 
Connelly 2008; Klausen and Bashford 2010). Contemporary 
attempts to reduce the size of the population are likely to 
incur the very same shortcomings identified above, as com-
peting interests are likely to influence people’s assessments 
of what counts as valuable (i.e. who should procreate and 
how much) and the decision of who gets to decide in these 
matters influences which interests will be given priority.
Addressing asymmetries
What then should guide normative debates on procrea-
tive decisions? What interests should be taken into con-
sideration and what kind of principles and frameworks are 
suited to protect them? I have argued that one of the major 
shortcomings of an individual-centred framework is that 
9 As argued by Alison Bashford: “[i]f population growth was to be 
reduced, the eugenic question was derivative: which kind of person 
might be reproductively restrained or encouraged?” (Bashford 2014, 
p. 242).
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it conceives procreation as a private matter and it fails to 
account for the effects of procreative decisions on third par-
ties and their legitimate interests. Insofar as it rests upon 
this framework, reproductive freedom as a moral principle 
to guide the normative debate on procreative decisions and 
as a standard to make trade-offs between competing inter-
ests is limited in scope. For this reason, past and present 
population engineering programmes may be shaped upon 
normative considerations that are better suited to discuss 
the ethics of procreation and to consider the interests of 
people other than the procreators. Despite these merits, 
past population engineering programmes ended up unfairly 
distributing the burdens and benefits of carrying out such 
programmes. In my view, present proposals risk incurring 
in similar problems, as lingering discriminatory and par-
tial attitudes may inform the structural design of population 
engineering programmes. Hence, I argue that any attempt 
to reflect on procreation more broadly would first have to 
address what Philip Kitcher (2001) refers to as political and 
epistemic asymmetries. According to Kitcher (2001), polit-
ical asymmetry occurs if (a) empirical data that supports 
certain lingering sexist or racist beliefs leads to reverting 
to a situation in which these beliefs were widespread, while 
empirical data that contradicts these lingering beliefs does 
not lead to a further eradication of these beliefs; and if (b) 
empirical data that supports certain lingering sexist or racist 
beliefs leads to the worsening of certain racial groups’ or of 
women’s lives, while empirical data that contradicts these 
lingering beliefs does not lead to notable improvements for 
these groups (Kitcher 2001, p. 97). Epistemic asymmetry 
occurs instead when certain studies and conclusions, theo-
ries and data, despite being assigned low reliability, will be 
taken more seriously than they should be (considering the 
low reliability) if they resonate with widespread racist and 
sexist beliefs. Population engineering programmes may end 
up constraining or influencing people’s procreative decisions 
and interfering with their freedom. Due to the relevance of 
procreation for people’s well-being and due to the tainted 
history of attempts to engineer the population, it is necessary 
to develop reliable strategies to make sure that political and 
epistemic asymmetries do not persist. In cases where stakes 
are so high, “standards of evidence must go up” (Kitcher 
2001, p. 96). Unless epistemic and political asymmetries are 
properly addressed, it seems that reflecting more broadly on 
procreation and considering the effects of procreative deci-
sions on third parties is not without risk.
These considerations confront those who discuss the 
ethics of procreative decisions with a dilemma: the first 
horn of the dilemma entails that a principle that protects 
procreators’ interests such as reproductive freedom is 
the most suited against potential violations of, and inter-
ference with, people’s procreative projects. The second 
instead entails that the effects of procreative decisions on 
third parties’ relevant interests are not sufficiently taken 
into account if normative debates on procreative decisions 
continue to be grounded in an individual-centred frame-
work. Until epistemic and political asymmetries are prop-
erly addressed and the risks of unfairly distributed burdens 
and benefits of population engineering programmes are 
minimised, I propose a way around this dilemma. This 
would entail defending people’s reproductive freedom as 
a theoretically imperfect but ad interim instrumentally 
necessary tool. The protection that reproductive freedom 
grants to people’s interests in making decisions about their 
procreative projects autonomously is theoretically flawed 
as it rests upon a narrow conception of the effects of pro-
creative decisions. It is also normatively problematic in 
that it protects procreators’ interests whilst not allowing 
to make trade-offs with other people’s potentially com-
peting interests. Hence, reproductive freedom should not 
be championed as what best protects people’s interests in 
well-being and autonomy. Rather, it should be championed 
as what at best (and ad interim) protects potentially vul-
nerable groups from harmful interferences. Within policy 
making and programmes aimed at regulating new repro-
ductive technologies, screening technologies, terminations 
of pregnancies and so forth, reproductive freedom should 
still guide decision-making, until epistemic and political 
asymmetries are properly addressed. At the same time, 
considering the far-reaching effects of procreative deci-
sions could enable to normatively appraise such effects on 
third parties and their interests.
Conclusion
In this article, I have argued that while reproductive free-
dom presents several shortcomings that have to do with the 
individual-centred framework that this principle rests upon. 
I have suggested that both twentieth century eugenics and 
contemporary proposals to carry out population engineering 
programmes are grounded in broader frameworks that allow 
to include reflections on the normative implications of pro-
creative decisions. Despite this, both past and present pro-
posals risk incurring in an unfair distribution of the burdens 
and benefits of population engineering programmes, unless 
epistemic and political asymmetries are addressed. For this 
reason, I have suggested that reproductive freedom should be 
defended as a theoretically imperfect but ad interim instru-
mentally necessary tool.
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